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Abstract 
 
Much of the literature on the causes of rising costs in higher education focuses on 
specific features and pathologies of decision-making within colleges and universities.  
We argue that this inward-looking focus on the specifics of higher education as an 
industry is a form of tunnel vision that can lead to poor public policy decisions.  In this 
paper we show that cost disease and capital-skill complementarity are two crucially 
important causes of rising costs in higher education.  These two economy-wide forces are 
something higher education shares with other skilled-labor-intensive services. 
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 The idea for this article started over a year ago when we first read David 
Longanecker’s article, “A Tale of Two Pities:  the Story of Higher Education Finance in 
America,” in the January/February 2006 issue of Change.  Longanecker describes a 
standoff between state legislators and representatives of state-supported colleges and 
universities.  The state legislators argue that they are doing their share by pointing to data 
showing that appropriations per student to colleges and universities have grown more 
rapidly than the inflation rate.  Representatives of state-supported colleges and 
universities argue that, on the contrary, state legislators are letting them down.  They 
point to data showing that state appropriations are a declining percentage of college and 
university revenues.  The data are accurate in both cases, and it does not take a rocket 
scientist to understand how this can be so.  The two observations are explained by the 
fact that costs per student in public higher education have risen much faster than the price 
of goods and services in the indexes we use to measure inflation. 
 With this explanation in hand, the next obvious question is: why do costs in 
higher education rise more rapidly than the overall inflation rate?  There is a long and 
rich literature in higher education finance addressing this question.  In this article we 
argue that the vast majority of this literature is incomplete because, by focusing 
exclusively on higher education, it suffers from a kind of tunnel vision.   
 The study of costs in any industry, higher education included, should focus on 
two questions:  First, what are the factors or industry characteristics that drive costs in 
that particular industry? Second, what are the factors that make costs in that industry 
similar to costs in other industries?  Most of the studies of cost pressures in higher 
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education address the first question.  They examine the special features of colleges and 
universities that have put upward pressure on costs.  We argue that the inward focus of 
these studies leads to an incomplete understanding of the forces that drive costs in higher 
education.  As a result the policy prescriptions flowing from these studies may be 
seriously flawed. 
 In brief, we show that higher education has experienced cost pressures quite 
similar to other services, and especially to services that depend on a highly educated 
labor force.  In part this is the familiar “cost disease” argument whose importance we 
think is underappreciated in the higher education literature.  But the cost pressures 
buffeting higher education also reflect another characteristic called ‘capital-skill 
complementarity’ that is common to many industries.  Within colleges and universities 
highly educated labor is displacing less well-educated labor.  This labor use pattern is 
also visible in the legal services industry and in physicians’ and dentists’ offices.  All 
three of these industries also have experienced a sustained rise in the value of the capital 
equipment they use relative to the value of other assets like buildings.   This tendency of 
capital and skilled labor going together can push up measured costs in service industries.  
Understanding these economy wide factors that push up cost is essential if we are to 
design policies that are effective in the institutional context of higher education.   
 
Explanations of Costs in Higher Education  
 We will not pretend to do a thorough review of the literature on higher education 
costs, but a good starting place for any brief review is the 1980 book by Howard Bowen 
in which he presents his oft-cited “revenue theory of costs.” Bowen argues that as 
nonprofit institutions colleges and universities try to maximize their revenue, and they 
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spend every dollar they raise.  As a consequence an institution’s revenues determine its 
costs.  This is clearly a higher education-specific explanation for rising college costs.  
According to Bowen, the factors that determine costs in higher education are the 
determinants of higher education revenue such as the appropriations given to state-
supported institutions, earnings on endowments, revenue from research grants, and 
earnings from tuition and fee charges.   The clear implication of this reasoning is that cost 
control in higher education comes from revenue control. 
 As a second example, in 1991 Malcolm Getz and John Siegfried listed six 
potential explanations for rapid cost increases in higher education.  Five of these 
explanations are higher education-specific:  (1) cost increases arising from a change in 
the product mix toward more expensive disciplines, (2) cost increases arising from 
shortages of higher education inputs, (3) cost increases arising from faculty and 
administrators in charge having inflated desires for quality, (4) cost increases arising 
from poor management in higher education, and (5) cost increases arising from 
government regulations creating expanded duties for colleges and universities.   
William F. Massy and Andrea K Wilger (1992) produce a similar list.  It contains 
four higher education-specific explanations: (1) regulation, micromanagement, and cost 
shifting – the increase in regulation and reporting requirements faced by higher 
education: (2) the growth force – costs increases caused by college and universities 
continued attempts to increase quality or prestige; (3) the administrative lattice – 
increases in costs caused by the ever increasing size and complexity of academic 
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administration, and (4) the academic ratchet – per student cost increases caused by 
faculty devoting less time to teaching and more time to research.1 
 The 2006 book by Robert Zemsky, Gregory R. Wenger, and William F. Massy, 
Remaking the American University:  Market-Smart and Mission-Centered provides an 
excellent restatement of the academic lattice and the faculty ratchet.  The administrative 
lattice refers to the growth over time in administrative support for all kinds of activities at 
colleges and universities, some of which are new, such as the expansion in the kind and 
quality of student services, and some (like advising) that were once were performed 
almost exclusively by faculty.  The academic ratchet refers to the process by which full-
time faculty have redefined their role in the institution to suit their own desires.   The 
most important supposed effect of the ratchet is the notable reduction in teaching loads 
won by faculty members over time.  The lattice and the ratchet are clearly related and 
both are offered as drivers of cost per full-time student in higher education.  This 
argument is intuitively quite appealing, yet like Bowen’s “revenue theory” it is based on 
descriptive analysis of what is going on in higher education and higher education alone.  
 The question that these studies do not address is whether any of the processes they 
describe also are underway in other industries, or alternatively whether there are any 
strong forces affecting costs in higher education common to other industries in the 
economy.  By ignoring this question, these studies imply that the answer is no.  Yet it is a 
very worthwhile question to ask, and the answers may add considerably to our 
understanding of the forces driving higher education costs. 
 
                                                 
1 Both Getz and Siegfried, and Massy and Wilger discuss one factor which we would not label higher 
education-specific.  They include the cost disease explanation in their list of potential explanations for 
increases in higher education costs.  We will discuss cost disease in more detail below. 
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 Looking Outside of Higher Education 
 If we take seriously the notion that we can learn something about cost increases in 
higher education from looking at industries experiencing similar patterns of cost increase, 
the first step would be to find out which other industries have, in fact, experienced similar 
cost increases.  In the detailed tables for the National Income and Product Accounts the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis provide data on the behavior of prices for a large number 
of goods and services.  These data are very useful for discovering the industries whose 
cost behavior is similar to the cost behavior in higher education. 
We need to dispense with one technical detail before we present these data.   
Since our focus is on costs in higher education, we would like to have data on costs in 
other industries.  Unfortunately, we do not have cost data.  We have price data.  Pricing 
in higher education is very unusual.  Price is cost per student minus the subsidy (from 
state appropriations, endowment earnings, and other sources) per student.  Price in other 
industries is cost per unit plus the profit margin per unit.  The assumption that allows us 
to compare the time series behavior of costs in higher education and prices in other 
industries is the assumption that there have not been major changes in the profit margins 
that confound the comparison.  In general, competitive forces should limit the change in 
profit margins making our assumption reasonable, but there may be some industries for 
which our assumption does not hold, at least in certain time periods.   
Figure 1 shows the behavior of costs in higher education and prices in a selected 
group of product categories from the price indexes for components of Personal 
Consumption Expenditures in the National Income and Product Accounts.  We created 
indexes for each product category that started in 1949 with a value of 1.00.  The values in   
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the figure are the real price of the product category, and the real costs of higher 
education.2  For example, the value of 1.5 for Legal services and Higher Ed Costs in 1959 
says that the prices of legal services and the cost in higher education both rose 50% faster 
than the price of all goods and services included in Personal Consumption Expenditures 
between 1949 and 1959.  The right-hand edge of the figure shows how much higher in 
real terms prices and costs were in 1995-96 than they were 1949.  For example, the value 
of 2.0 for Physicians indicates that the price of the services of physicians has increased 
twice as fast as prices in general, and the value of roughly .6 for New Autos indicates that 
the prices of new autos have not increased as rapidly as prices in general. 
Figure 1 Time Path of Real Costs, Selected Industries
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2 The data for the individual price indexes comes from in Table 2.4.4 on the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
website.  The data for costs in Higher Education are for Educational and General Expenditures per student 
and come from the Digest of Educational Statistics, 2000 Table 339. 
 7
 Figure 1 is extracted from a much larger analysis.3  The detailed data for product 
categories for Personal Consumption Expenditures has 69 product categories for the level 
of aggregation we are using, and our figure only includes 8 of them.  Our eight product 
categories are selected to be representative of the findings from a broader analysis.  The 
first finding they illustrate is that the prices of services rise much more rapidly than the 
prices of goods.  The price indexes for the services of lawyers, physicians, dentists, 
domestic servants, and barbers all rise relative to the average (1.00), while the prices of 
the goods (food, shoes, and new autos) all fall relative to the average.  This is consistent 
with the aggregate data.  From 1930 to 2000 the average price of durable goods rose by a 
factor of 4.12, the average price of nondurable goods rose 8.24 times, and the average 
price of services rose 11.11 times. The second finding the figure illustrates is that after 
1980 the prices of services that rely on highly educated labor (lawyers, physicians, and 
dentists) rise much more rapidly than the prices of services that rely on less well educated 
labor (domestic servants and barbers).  
 The similarity between the behavior of higher education costs and the prices of 
legal services and physicians, and to a lesser extent, dentists, might simply be a 
coincidence.  Clearly there are important changes specific to these industries.  For 
example, federal rule making and funding of Medicaid and Medicare have clearly 
affected the costs and prices of physicians’ services, and the advent of fluoride treatment 
has affected the demand for dentists.  Still, it is not a coincidence that the prices of 
services have increased more rapidly than the prices of goods, and it is not a coincidence 
that the prices of services that rely on highly educated labor have similar time paths. 
 
                                                 
3 See Archibald and Feldman (forthcoming).  
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 Cost Disease 
 Economists have known the reason that the prices of services rise more rapidly 
than the prices of goods since the work of David Ricardo in 1817.  The reason is that 
productivity growth is very difficult in many services, particularly personal services.  
When you purchase a personal service like a haircut, you are purchasing the time of the 
barber, and there are limited things he or she can do to shorten the experience that will 
not be perceived as a reduction in the quality of the haircut.  The possibility of 
productivity growth in the production of goods is not similarly limited.  In 1966 William 
J. Baumol and William G. Bowen explained this phenomenon, which is typically called 
“cost disease,” with reference to performing arts.  The most frequently quoted example 
comes from a 1967 article of Baumol.  He notes, “a half hour horn quintet calls for the 
expenditure of 2.5 man hours, and any attempt to increase productivity here is likely to be 
viewed with concern by critics and audiences alike.”4  
 Many have pointed out the applicability of cost disease to higher education.5  
Like other personal services, some productivity improvements will be perceived as 
quality reductions.  If a college or university increases the number of students in its 
average class or raises the number of classes each instructor teaches, then productivity 
measured as students taught per faculty-year would grow.  Bigger classes are not likely to 
lead to a better education, and more time teaching might well come at the expense of 
research or public service.  These plausible consequences of reallocating university effort 
represent what is arguably a reduction in the overall performance of the institution, which 
                                                 
4 See Baumol (1967) page 416. 
5 Baumol and Sue Ann Blackman (1995) is perhaps the best known paper of this type in higher education.  
Also, in the discussion above we highlighted the higher education-specific explanation in Getz and 
Siegried’s and Massy and Wilger’s lists.  In both studies cost disease was also included. 
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is why this path of ‘productivity enhancement’ is one that colleges and universities 
generally have resisted.  Massy and Wilger argue that the faculty ratchet has moved 
universities in the opposite direction.  Whether that ratchet has been the driving force of 
costs is unclear, since much the same effect is at work in other service industries with 
very different internal dynamics. 
Figure 1 also shows that the time path of costs in higher education is much more 
similar to the time path of the prices of personal services that rely on highly educated 
labor than it is to the time path of services that do not rely on highly educated labor.  This 
difference is explained by changes in the return to higher education that can be observed 
in national data.  The period from the end of World War II to the late 1970s saw a 
significant leveling of the income distribution.6  Starting in 1980 the income distribution 
started to widen -- in relative terms, the rich got richer and the poor got poorer.  Much of 
this widening of the income distribution can be attributed to a rise in the returns to higher 
education.  The divergence of the time paths of prices of legal services, physicians’ and 
dentists’ services, and costs in higher education from the time path of the prices of 
domestic service and barbershops is consistent with this explanation.    
 
Explaining Changes in Higher Education Costs 
We began this article by saying that any explanation of costs in an industry should 
focus as much on the similarities among industries as on the particular features that cause 
it to be distinct.  We think that the discussion of cost trends in higher education often 
misses or downplays economy-wide economic factors and that this omission has 
consequences.  An exclusive inward focus on the specific features of higher education 
                                                 
6 Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo (1992) call this time period the “Great Compression.”  
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paints a very incomplete picture of the industry and can lead to poor public policy 
choices.  
A more complete explanation of higher education costs has to start with the fact 
that higher education is a service industry.  Costs of service industries behave very 
differently from costs in goods industries.  Any explanation of costs in higher education 
that misses that point is focused on the trees and has missed the forest. 
Recognizing that higher education is a personal service industry helps us sort out 
the disagreement between state legislators and representatives of state-supported colleges 
and universities discussed by David Longanecker.  Three facts explain the information 
given.  First, higher education is a personal service industry.  Second, costs in service 
industries, particularly personal service industries, will rise more rapidly than costs in 
goods-producing industries.  Third, any broad index one might use to measure inflation 
will mix together the prices of goods and the prices of services.  As a result, state 
appropriations that keep up with a broad measure of inflation will not keep up with costs 
in a personal service industry such as higher education.  
There is no doubt that there are peculiarities of higher education, but one has to be 
very clear whether or not the features of higher education on which one places 
importance are really peculiarities of higher education and not manifestations of some 
broader phenomenon.  Let us return now to the argument that the growth of the 
administrative lattice is an important part of the explanation for rising costs in higher 
education.  If one takes the position that studies of costs should look both inside and 
outside the industry under study, the question surrounding the administrative lattice is 
whether a similar phenomenon can be found in other industries.  While we have not done 
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an in-depth study of this question, something similar to the expanding administrative 
lattice may be going on in other industries whose cost behavior is similar to higher 
education. 
Capital-Skill Complementarity 
There is some direct evidence of an administrative lattice effect in higher 
education.  The percentage of full time equivalent employees classified as Executive, 
Administrative or Managerial grew from 6.4% in 1976 to 6.7% in 1993 and then to 7.3% 
in 2003.7  This is certainly an increase, but is not as significant as other staffing changes 
in higher education.  The more fundamental and substantial changes in employment 
patterns are changes higher education shares with other industries that display similar 
cost behavior such as physicians & dentists and legal services.  In each of the industries 
the percentage of non-professional workers in the industry’s workforce has declined 
substantially over the last thirty years.  Non-professional workers are defined as those 
whose job category does not require a university degree.  Of the three industries, higher 
education has experienced the greatest shift away from less skilled labor in its workforce.  
These data are presented in Figure 2.8  
The evidence in Figure 2 is broadly consistent with the phenomenon known as 
capital-skill complementarity.  First hypothesized by Zvi Griliches (1969), capital-skill 
complementarity is present if increased physical capital usage raises the demand for 
skilled labor (a complementary factor) more than the demand for unskilled labor.  Goldin 
                                                 
7 Digest of Educational Statistics 2005 Table 222. 
8 The data for all three years for higher education come from Digest of Educational Statistics 2005 Table 
222.  Data for Physicians/Dental Practices and Legal Services for 1980 come from Occupational 
Employment in Selected Non-manufacturing Industries Bulletin 2088, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, March 1981.  Data for 1990 come from tables provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and data for 2004 come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site 
(http://www.bls/oes/current/oessrci.htm).   
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and Katz (1998) have found evidence that capital and skilled labor to go together in U.S. 
manufacturing for much of the 20th century, especially as new technology is introduced in 
the production process.  We think this effect likely is present in service industries like 
higher education as well. 
 
Figure 2.  Percentage of non-professional workers
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Within these three service industries the real value of equipment has been rising 
relative to the real value of buildings since the mid-1960s.  Figure 3 presents this 
information.  Nominal values for equipment and buildings for higher education come 
from the 2005 Digest of Educational Statistics.  The corresponding information for 
Physicians and Dentists and for Legal Services comes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  To convert these data into real values we use price indexes from the Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis on non-residential structures to create a time series for buildings, and 
on equipment and software to create the time series for equipment.   
 
Figure 3. Ratio of Real Value of Equipment to Buildings
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The three series are not identical.  The ratio in higher education, for instance, is 
the lowest because of the intensity of building use both for academic purposes and for 
living space (dormitories).  Also, the upturn in the series do not occur at exactly the same 
time.  Thus there is some scope for industry-specific effects.  Nonetheless, even if it is 
not direct evidence of capital-skill complementarity, the clear correlation between the 
increased importance of physical capital in these three service industries and the 
increased share of high cost professional labor in the labor they use after the mid 1970s 
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strongly suggests that economy-wide forces again are a significant part of any 
explanation of rising costs in higher education. 
Those familiar with economics will at this point be wondering how capital-skill 
complementarity can be a source of increasing costs.  Holding the quality of output 
constant, the reason that a company would install new capital and hire the skilled workers 
to operate and maintain it is that production with the new capital and the skilled workers 
is less expensive than production with the old capital and the less skilled workers.  If this 
were not so, there would be no economic rationale to install the new capital.   Clearly 
such an economic rationale has been evident to managers in many industries.  Adopting 
new technologies has been very beneficial for producers of many standardized 
manufactured goods (everything from glass bottles to cement). The benefits of 
productivity-enhancing technological progress show up directly as some combination of 
reduced cost per unit and higher returns to labor.  Both of these effects also lead to lower 
costs for manufactured goods relative to services, which is the main conclusion of the 
cost disease argument. 
Some of this cost-reducing effect of new technology is indeed present in higher 
education.  Those of us who did our graduate work before the advent of the personal 
computer remember the typing pool that prepared everything from a professor’s tests to 
their professional manuscripts.  That pool exists only in memory.  Faculty members now 
do all of that work themselves with the assistance of personal computers and a corps of 
highly educated and expensive IT specialists who manage university software systems 
and networks.  The choice to replace the typing pool with personal computers and IT 
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support personnel is at least in part a decision to choose a less expensive means of 
production.   
Yet a skill-intensive personal service industry like higher education is different 
from basic manufacturing industries producing a homogeneous output that is essentially 
unchanging over time. Its unusual nature stems in part from the fact that genuine 
productivity enhancements are much more difficult to achieve.  As we argued earlier, 
forcing higher numbers of students through an existing teaching process will be seen as a 
reduction in quality.  The other reason, and likely the more important reason for the effect 
of capital-skill complementarity on costs, is the fact that higher education is constantly 
updating its output.  
The adoption of new technology and the associated use of skilled workers in 
higher education traces to public expectations that higher education stays current.  To 
most people who demand these services the quality of the output is very much related to 
the technology that is used.  Any university that decided to teach the same curriculum it 
did in the 1950s likely would appeal to a very small market niche. The service we 
provide today in higher education has undergone a profound evolution and is in many 
ways a very different service than the one we experienced a generation or more ago in 
college classrooms.   
In higher education the chalk, paper, pen, and test tube world has been replaced 
by wired buildings, laptops, high-tech classrooms, and pulsed laser systems in physics 
labs, together with the specialists needed to make the systems work. This change has its 
roots in the fact that the outputs of higher education are the inputs of other industries.  
This forces higher education institutions to educate students to a standard influenced in 
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part by those who will hire its students.  The undergraduate chemist, for instance, has to 
be able to understand and operate the equipment used in a modern industrial chemistry 
lab.  Without this knowledge he or she would not be useful to the pharmaceutical industry 
or the bio-technology industry, industries that have themselves adopted a series of 
technological advancements that raise the quality of their output.9  As a result, the motive 
for technological change in higher education often traces more to enhancements of the 
education offered than to cost control.  Although the typing pool example shows how 
technological progress could decrease costs, the net effect of adopting new techniques 
has increased costs in higher education.   
There is a similar dynamic at work in the offices of physicians and dentists and 
the offices of lawyers.  Any doctor or dentist who chose to practice using only the 
techniques available a generation ago would soon lose his or her patient base.  Patients 
have come to expect a standard of care, and in some cases they are required by law to 
receive care that meets certain standards. As a result new medical equipment does not 
lower the cost of medicine, it makes procedures more precise, it makes surgery less 
invasive, and it add to the physicians’ ability to correctly diagnose certain conditions.  
Just as with higher education, the existence of the technology changes the service 
provided by the physicians and dentists.  
The case of lawyers is quite similar.  As Douglas E. Litowitz (1997) explains 
there has been an explosion in the use of technology in lawyers’ offices.  Because of this 
new technology legal clients have raised their expectations of the quality of services 
                                                 
9 The presence of new equipment in industrial chemistry labs in some cases results from the research efforts 
of colleges and universities.  In this way the new capital requirements for the education of students are a 
result of the activities of higher education not simply as the activities of the industry.  Still, no matter who 
started the process, a good education has to be an up to date education, and in many fields such an 
education involves more and more elaborate equipment.     
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lawyers can provide.  Clients now expect to be able to contact their lawyer almost around 
the clock.  Because legal documents can easily be redrafted, they are customized much 
more than they were in the past.  Because legal research has the aid of computer searches, 
lawyers are expected to have all of the relevant case law at their fingertips.  As with 
colleges and universities and physicians and dentists, a law firm that practiced law the 
same way it had in the 1950s or 1960s would not meet the expectations of today’s client.   
In summary, our earlier claim that firms would willingly embrace technology that 
required more skilled-labor-intensive practices only if the new techniques reduced costs 
was a claim contingent on the assumption that the quality of the output was constant.  
This is simply not an assumption that works for many personal service industries, 
including higher education, the offices of physicians and dentists, and the offices of 
lawyers.   Since quality-adjusted output in higher education is notoriously difficult to 
measure, the quality improvements inherent in the changed technologies tend to go 
unnoticed.  The cost increases per student, however, are quite visible. 
The quantity and quality of research output is also one of the main areas of 
potential gains from this technological paradigm shift in higher education.  But this will 
not show up in relative cost data since research output is poorly measured and hard to 
compare either over time or across universities.  Colleges and universities also do more 
things for their students than they did in the past.  Whether this is due primarily to an 
administrative lattice or faculty ratchet is unclear, given that many other industries are 
experiencing the same trends in hiring educated labor and capital equipment. In our view, 
capital-skill complementarity provides a better explanation because it is a more general 
theory.   
 18
Consequences  
 Our study of higher education costs has convinced us that higher education faces 
many of the same problems as other industries.  If we accept the importance of the cost 
disease and the capital-skill complementarity explanations of cost increases in higher 
education, the interesting question becomes: how much more can we learn by adding 
higher education-specific factors?  This is a difficult question, and we are not yet in a 
position to provide an answer.  What we can say is that ignoring economy-wide factors 
such as cost disease and capital-skill complementarity is a serious error.      
 Ignorance of the economy-wide factors that affect costs in industries like higher 
education can lead to deeply problematic policy proposals.  If one accepts the “revenue 
theory,” for instance, as an overarching explanation for rising college costs then the 
answer to cost control is revenue control.  Governments must hold the line on public 
subsidies while disciplining colleges and universities that raise tuition too much.  This is 
the logic behind recent proposals emanating from the education subcommittees of the 
House of Representatives.  The report titled "The College Cost Crisis" asserted that 
wasteful spending by colleges and universities is the main cause of escalating tuition.  
Representative Howard (Buck) McKeon then proposed cutting off federal support to 
institutions whose list-price tuition goes up by more than twice the inflation rate for two 
consecutive years. 
 Price controls may seem natural as a response to seemingly irresponsible choices.  
On the other hand, if more fundamental forces are instrumental in pushing up costs then 
holding university spending constant through revenue and price controls is a recipe for 
reduced quality and reduced access to higher education.   
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  Conclusions 
We should return to our primary question:  why do costs in higher education rise 
more rapidly than prices in general?  Our answer is deceptively simple.  Costs in higher 
education rise more rapidly than prices in general because higher education is the kind of 
industry it is. Three factors are important, (1) higher education is a personal service 
industry, (2) higher education relies on highly educated labor, and (3) because of 
increased capital usage (and the new technologies embodied in this capital), higher 
education’s reliance on highly educated labor has increased. 
  These explanations might not be appealing to some because they seem to deny 
agency.  Costs are going up because of particular factors, not because anyone is doing 
anything.  In contrast, higher education-specific explanations often place blame on 
particular actors. We don’t mean to deny agency.  There certainly are individual agents 
such as college administrators, members of boards, legislators, and governors, all of 
whom are responsible for decisions that affect costs in higher education.  Rather than 
denying agents their role, our analysis highlights the constraints agents face when they 
make the decisions that result in higher costs.  Our analysis suggests that higher 
education decision makers are faced with choices that result in either rising costs or 
declining quality.  If the decision makers do not offer competitive salaries, they will not 
be able to attract the best workforce.  If the decision makers try to increase output per 
worker, they may well decrease the quality of the education they provide.  And if they do 
not provide the best equipment for their workers, they will not offer an up-to-date 
education or produce leading edge research.  The fact that ever-increasing costs have 
resulted from the collective decisions of these agents suggests to us that the majority of 
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these choices have come out on the side of trying to preserve or increase quality as 
opposed to the side of decreasing costs. 
 The difficulty with the tunnel vision that has characterized much of the research 
in higher education finance is that it leaves out the possibility that what we see in higher 
education has roots in underlying economic processes that affect many industries.  Higher 
education is of course different or unique in some sense, and so is every other industry.  
Yet the behavior of costs in some industries is close to the behavior of costs in higher 
education, and the similarity is not a coincidence.  We can learn a great deal about the 
causes of rapid cost increases in higher education and the policies that might be put in 
place to improve the situation if we take a close look at these other industries and explore 
the commonalities between them and higher education.   We are not apologists for the 
status quo, but we do recognize that there are no easy fixes for what are deep-seated 
problems in achieving significant cost-reducing productivity growth in an important 
personal service industry like higher education. 
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